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Abstract 
Tucker and Zarowin (2006) examine the impact of income smoothing on earnings 
informativeness, as proxied by the future earnings response coefficient (FERC). In this 
paper, we replicate Tucker and Zarowin (2006) and compare the results between the US 
and China markets. Specifically, using a sample of US firms from 2003 to 2008, we first 
find results consistent with Tucker and Zarowin (2006) that income smoothing improves 
FERC. However, our analysis for the China market over the same sample period indicates 
that income smoothing has little impact on FERC. Within the China market, we further 
find that income smoothing does not affect FERC for state-owned enterprises (SOEs) but 
weakly affects FERC for non-state-owned enterprises (non-SOEs). We argue that the 
market-level differences in information environment partly account for the differential 
impacts of income smoothing on FERC. 
 
I. Introduction 
The prior accounting literature has been interested in assessing the informativeness 
of earnings since the publication of two seminal papers by Ball and Brown (1968) and 
Beaver (1968). Early studies have documented a clear annual-window association 
between stock returns and current earnings. However, this contemporaneous 
return-earnings relation is found to be weak (e.g. Lev, 1989; Francis and Schipper, 1999; 
Lev and Zarowin, 1999). Collins, Kothari, Shanken, and Sloan (1994; hereinafter, CKSS), 
who initiated the FERC (i.e. future earnings response coefficient) framework, argue that 
current earnings’ lack of timeliness explains the weak relation, implying that future 
earnings should be included in the traditional return-earnings relation model. Since then, 
a large strand of studies has applied the FERC framework to proxy for earnings 
                                                        
* We appreciate Jim Ohlson, Pepa Kraft (the discussant), and seminar participants at the 2013 China 
Accounting and Finance Review Special Issue Conference for their helpful comments and suggestions. 
All remaining errors are our own. 
1 C. S. Agnes Cheng, Professor and Head, School of Accounting and Finance, The Hong Kong 
Polytechnic University; email: afagnes@polyu.edu.hk. Shuo Li, School of Accounting and Finance, 
The Hong Kong Polytechnic University; email: 13901208r@connect.polyu.hk. 
10.7603/s40570-014-0010-6
Does Income Smoothing Improve Earnings Informativeness? 129 
informativeness and have documented that FERC is affected by firms’ disclosure practice, 
information intermediaries, and corporate accounting policies.2 
As one of the key indicators of earnings quality, income smoothing has been widely 
examined for decades. When managers use their reporting discretions to smooth earnings 
over time, the informativeness of earnings can be either improved or impaired depending 
on the managerial incentives underlying income smoothing activities. Specifically, if 
managers smooth earnings to efficiently communicate private information about the firm, 
income smoothing improves earnings informativeness. On the other hand, if managers 
smooth earnings to opportunistically mask the real performance of the firm, the reported 
earnings become less informative. It is an empirical question which incentive dominates 
in a cross-sectional setting. To investigate this question, Tucker and Zarowin (2006, 
hereinafter TZ) implement CKSS’s framework and provide large sample evidence from 
US firms consistent with the incentive of efficient private information communication. 
They document that income smoothing is associated with more informative earnings, as 
reflected by higher FERC. 
In this paper, we apply TZ’s research design to the China market and examine if 
TZ’s findings still hold in China. As an important emerging market, China is generally 
considered to be a market with poor investor protection, which in turn leads to a poor 
information environment (Morck et al., 2000). Also, in China, most listed firms are 
partially privatised and corporate ownership is highly concentrated in the central/local 
government or in government-controlled institutions such as state-owned enterprises 
(SOEs). According to Piotroski and Wong (2000), this unique institutional environment 
in China reduces the transparency in financial reporting. For example, since the 
controlling shareholders of SOEs exercise nearly full control over major corporate 
decisions, related-party transactions are prevalent among SOEs, which significantly curbs 
managers’ incentives to provide transparent information to the public. Therefore, it is 
interesting to examine how managers’ income smoothing activities affect earnings 
informativeness in China. 
Using a sample of US firms from 2003 to 2008,3 we find evidence consistent with 
TZ that FERC is higher for “higher-smoothing” firms than that for “lower-smoothing” 
firms. For the sample of Chinese firms, income smoothing does not affect FERC. 
However, we find that for both US firms and Chinese firms, income smoothing has a 
significant positive impact on the earnings response coefficient (ERC). These results are 
robust to decomposing earnings into cash flows and accruals components and to 
controlling for potentially omitted variables and cross-sectional correlations.  
We argue that the market-level difference in information environment may partly 
account for the different results from the two markets with respect to the impact of 
income smoothing on FERC. In particular, as a better information environment makes 
value-relevant information more accessible to average investors, it reduces the costs for 
private information searching and facilitates more efficient investment decision making. 
Therefore, for firms in a market with a rich information environment (e.g. the US market), 
investors are able to utilise all sources of information to better interpret managers’ 
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income smoothing incentives in conveying private information about future earnings (i.e. 
income smoothing improves FERC). On the contrary, in a market with a poor information 
environment (e.g. the China market) where the information set is incomplete and the 
information uncertainty is high, investors may not be able to apply smoothed earnings to 
predict future earnings (i.e. income smoothing has no impact on FERC). Our explanation 
is consistent with a concurrent paper by Cheng et al. (2014), who provide large sample 
evidence from US firms that the average associations between income smoothing and 
ERC/FERC are dependent on the firm-level information environment. Cheng et al.’s 
(2014) finding has one important implication, namely that the information environment 
plays an important role when evaluating the effect of financial reporting quality on ERC 
and FERC.  
In addition, given that the dominance of SOEs in the China market is a key factor 
affecting firms’ reporting incentive (Piotroski and Wong, 2012), we further separate our 
Chinese firms into SOEs and non-state-owned enterprises (non-SOEs) and investigate if 
the impacts of income smoothing on FERC differ for these two subgroups. The results 
show that income smoothing does not affect FERC for SOEs but does weakly affect 
FERC for non-SOEs. In analysing the extended model where earnings are decomposed 
into cash flows and accruals components, the evidence shows that the current returns of 
higher-smoothing non-SOEs incorporate more information about their future cash flows. 
These results are consistent with the conjecture that SOEs and non-SOEs have different 
information environments. For non-SOEs, investors may rely more on information other 
than reported earnings when assessing firm value.   
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows: Section II describes the research 
methodology applied by TZ; in Section III, we present our sample and descriptive 
statistics and report our empirical results; and Section IV concludes the paper. 
 
II. Research Methodology 
2.1 Measure of Income Smoothing 
TZ measure income smoothing as the negative correlation between the change in 
discretionary accruals and the change in pre-discretionary income based on the modified 
Jones (1991) model adjusted for firm’s performance (Kothari et al., 2005).  
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Equation (1) is estimated cross-sectionally each year within the same industry group 
(industry is defined by the two-digit SIC for US firms and the one-digit Industry 
Classifying Index Code for Chinese firms) to obtain the expected (non-discretionary) 
accruals, and the difference between the observed value and the fitted value (i.e. the 
residual tˆ ) is the discretionary accruals predicted (DAP). Pre-discretionary income (PDI) 
is then defined as net income minus discretionary accruals. As the volatility of earnings 
consists of three components (i.e. the volatility of operating cash flows, the volatility of 
accruals, and the correlation between operating cash flows and accruals), the volatility of 
earnings will be lower when the correlation between operating cash flows and accruals is 
more negative. Therefore, the more negative the correlation, the smoother the income 
stream should be. Therefore, the income smoothing measure is the negative correlation 
between the change in a firm’s discretionary accruals and the change in its 
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pre-discretionary income using a 5-year rolling window: IS_Rawit = –Corr (ΔDAPit , 
ΔPDIit). To control for industry and time effects, TZ use a firm’s fractional ranking of raw 
income smoothing (between 0 and 1) within its industry-year and refer to it as ISit. As a 
result, a higher value of ISit represents a higher level of income smoothing. 
2.2 Measures of Earnings Informativeness 
To investigate the ability of returns to reflect information in current and future 
earnings, CKSS develop the FERC framework as follows:  
    3 1 110 )(k tkttktt XEUXR  ,                          (2) 
where Rt is the continuously compounded return for fiscal year t, Xt is the continuously 
compounded growth rate of earnings, UXt = Xt  Et-1(Xt) is the unexpected earnings 
growth rate, and Et is the change in market expectations from the beginning to the end 
of period t. Under the assumption that earnings follow a random walk, CKSS use the 
realised earnings for year t+k as the proxy for the earnings expectation formed at the end 
of year t and use past earnings to form an expectation at the beginning of the year t. 
However, as CKSS point out, using realised future earnings to proxy for investors’ 
expectation introduces an error into the variables problem. To reduce the measurement 
error, they include future returns as the instrument variable in the model. Furthermore, to 
increase the power of the test, Lundholm and Myers (2002) combine three future years’ 
earnings into variable Xt3 and three future years’ returns into Rt3, making a more general 
model as follows: 
tttttt RbXbXbXbbR   34332110 ,                              (3) 
where the coefficient b2 represents ERC and the coefficient b3 represents FERC. Both 
ERC and FERC are predicted to be positive. 
To test the impact of income smoothing on earnings informativeness, TZ expand 
equation (3) by adding the income smoothing measure IS and its interactions with the 
independent variables as follows: 
ttttttt
tttttttt
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If the dominating effect of income smoothing is to convey information about future 
earnings, the coefficient b8 should be positive. If the dominating effect of income 
smoothing is to garble accounting earnings information, then the coefficient b8 should be 
negative.  
 
Table 1  Variable Definitions 
Variables for Estimating Discretionary Accruals 
TAcct = Total accruals, the dependent variable, measured as income before
extraordinary items less operating cash flows less cash flows from
extraordinary items, at year t, following the approach in Hribar and Collins
(2002) 
ΔSalest   = Change in sales, sales revenue at year t less sales revenue at year t-1 
PPEt = Net property, plant and equipment at year t 
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ROAt = Return on assets at year t, measured as net income before extraordinary items
(IB) at year t, scaled by total assets at year t-1 
TAt-1 = Total assets at year t-1 
Variables in the FERC Model 
Rt = The buy-and-hold returns for the 12-month period starting 3 months after 
year t-1 fiscal year-end 
Xt-1   = The income before extraordinary items available to common stockholders for 
fiscal year t-1, scaled by market value at the beginning of fiscal year t 
Xt = The income before extraordinary items available to common for fiscal year t, 
scaled by market value at the beginning of fiscal year t 
Xt3 = The sum of income before extraordinary items available to common for fiscal 
year t+1 through t+3, scaled by market value at the beginning of fiscal year t 
Rt3 = The annually compounded stock returns for fiscal year t+1 through t+3 
ISt = The reversed fractional ranking of the Pearson Correlation between the 
current year and past four years’ change in discretionary accruals and change
in pre-managed income 
CFOt-1 = The cash flows from operations reported in cash flow statements for fiscal
year t-1, scaled by market value at the beginning of fiscal year t 
CFOt = The cash flows from operations reported in cash flow statements for fiscal
year t, scaled by market value at the beginning of fiscal year t 
CFOt3 = The cash flows from operations reported in cash flow statements for fiscal 
year t+1 though t+3, scaled by market value at the beginning of fiscal year t 
ACCt-1 = The total accruals for fiscal year t-1 calculated by subtracting operating cash 
flows from net income before extraordinary items, scaled by market value at
the beginning of fiscal year t  
ACCt = The total accruals for fiscal year t, scaled by market value at the beginning of
fiscal year t  
ACCt3 = The total accruals for fiscal year t+1 through t+3, scaled by market value at
the beginning of fiscal year t  
EPSt = The income before extraordinary items available to common, scaled by total 
shares outstanding at the beginning of fiscal year t  
EPSt3 = The sum of income before extraordinary items available to common for fiscal 
year t+1 through t+3, scaled by total shares outstanding at the beginning of 
fiscal year t  
Control Variables   
SIZEt = The within industry-year fractional ranking (between 0 and 1) of a firm’s
market value at the beginning of fiscal year t 
BMt   = The within industry-year fractional ranking (between 0 and 1) of a firm’s
book-to-market ratio at the beginning of fiscal year t 
Earnstdt = The within industry-year fractional ranking (between 0 and 1) of a firm’s
standard deviation of income before extraordinary items for fiscal year t+1
to t+3, scaled by the market value at the beginning of fiscal year t 
NANALt = The within industry-year fractional ranking (between 0 and 1) of a firm’s
average number of analyst forecasts included in monthly consensus
compiled by IBES during the fiscal year for US firms and calculated from
the Detailed Financial Analyst Forecast Database for Chinese firms. If a
firm-year is not covered, the number of analyst following is set to 0  
LOSSt = 1 if a firm reports negative earnings for fiscal year t and 0 otherwise  
SOEt = 1 if a firm is a state-owned enterprise for fiscal year t and 0 otherwise. This
variable is only applicable for Chinese firms. 
 
Does Income Smoothing Improve Earnings Informativeness? 133 
III. Data and Main Empirical Results 
3.1 Sample Selection 
For the US sample, we collect financial statement data from the 2012 version of the 
COMPUSTAT database, stock returns and prices from CRSP, and numbers of analysts 
from the IBES summary history file. We first replicate TZ’s results using the same 
sample period (1993 to 2000). The sample period starts with 1993 because 1988 is the 
first year in which firms are required to report cash flow statements and we require the 
availability of the most recent 5-year time series of financial data (i.e. ΔDAP and ΔPDI) 
to calculate the income smoothing measure. We exclude firms in the financial industries 
(SIC 6000-6999) due to the unique nature of their accounting requirements. The 
untabulated results are comparable to those documented by TZ.  
We also construct a Chinese sample using the 2011 version of the China Stock 
Market and Accounting Research (CSMAR) Financial Statement Database, Trading 
Database, and Financial Analyst Forecast Database. Since cash flow statements are not 
available in China until 1998, the sample period for the primary analysis starts from 2003. 
The period ends at 2008 because the FERC model requires 3-year (i.e. from t+1 to t+3) 
future annual earnings and returns data. Similarly, we exclude firms from the financial 
industries (one-digit Industry Classifying Index Code is “I”). We focus only on Chinese 
tradable A-shares on the Shanghai and Shenzhen exchanges. For comparison purposes, 
we construct our main US sample using the same sample period as the Chinese sample, 
namely 2003 to 2008.4  
To obtain the income smoothing measure, we first estimate discretionary accruals. 
For the original US sample, we use the data from 1998-2008 and estimate equation (1) on 
each of the 672 industry-year cross-sections after excluding those that have fewer than 10 
observations and winsorising the regression variables at the top and bottom 1% standard 
deviations each year. For the Chinese sample, we follow the same estimation procedure, 
which results in the estimation of equation (1) on each of the 131 industry-year 
cross-sections. 
We use the residual from equation (1) as the measure of a firm’s discretionary 
accruals (DAP). PDI is calculated as net income scaled by beginning total assets minus 
DAP. We delete firm-year observations that have missing data for either ΔDAP or ΔPDI 
in the current year or any of the past 4 years. In addition, we delete the firm-year 
observations that have missing data for (a) past, current, and future three years’ earnings, 
operating cash flows, and accruals and (b) current and future three years’ returns. To 
minimise the effect of outliers, we delete the observations in the top or bottom 1% of the 
distribution of the above variables, consistent with the procedures applied by TZ. These 
procedures result in 13,194 firm-year observations for the US sample and 4,854 firm-year 
observations for the Chinese sample. 
3.2 Descriptive Statistics and Correlations 
Table 2 presents the mean, standard deviation, median, minimum, and maximum of 
the coefficient estimates and R2. Panels A and B show our replication using the US and 
the Chinese sample, respectively. The results are comparable to those reported in TZ. In 
particular, the coefficients on 
1

t
t
TA
Sales  are both significantly positive, consistent with 
the asset turnover theory that accruals should be positively related to change in sales; the 
                                                        
4 For simplicity, we only report results for US and Chinese firms during this period. 
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coefficients on ROAt are also significantly positive, confirming that the accruals are 
associated with firm performance; and the coefficients on 
1t
t
TA
PPE  are both significantly 
negative.  
The results reported in Table 2 reflect some fundamental differences between US 
and Chinese firms. For example, the mean (median) of the coefficient on Sales is 0.018 
(0.025) and 0.036 (0.039) for the US and the Chinese sample, respectively, reflecting a 
lower accrual ratio per dollar increase in sales in the US, perhaps due to the tighter credit 
policy in the US. The mean (median) of the coefficient on PPE is -0.088 (-0.084) and 
-0.102 (-0.103) for the US and the Chinese samples respectively, reflecting a lower 
depreciation rate in the US. 
 
Table 2  Cross-Sectional Estimation of Discretionary Accruals 
The Jones Model, modified by Kothari et al. (2005): 
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Panel A: Summary statistics of the estimated coefficients and R2 of 672 US industry-year 
regressions from 1998-2008 
Statistics a b c d R2 
Mean -0.029 0.018 -0.088 0.474  0.765  
Std Dev 2.925 0.168 0.113 0.294  0.205  
Median 0.015 0.025 -0.084 0.501  0.821  
Minimum -59.277 -0.932 -0.784 -1.881 0.021  
Maximum 16.257 0.990 0.858 1.780  1.000  
Panel B: Summary statistics of the estimated coefficients and R2 of 131 China 
industry-year regressions from 1998-2008 
Statistics a b c d R2 
Mean 0.107 0.036 -0.102 0.672  0.447  
Std Dev 14.674 0.115 0.075 0.318  0.190  
Median -0.479 0.039 -0.103 0.686  0.463  
Minimum -51.957 -0.486 -0.347 -0.281 0.063  
Maximum 37.265 0.285 0.108 1.406  0.903  
For the US sample, industries are classified by the first two digits of the SIC code. For the Chinese 
sample, industries are classified by the first digit of the Industry Classifying Index Code released by the 
CSRC. All the variables are defined in Table 1. 
 
Table 3 Panel A provides the descriptive statistics for all the variables in our primary 
tests. Our results are consistent with those reported in TZ. In particular, for the US sample, 
the mean and median for all the returns and earnings variables as well as the income 
smoothing measures are very similar as those documented by TZ. Comparing the 
descriptive statistics of the US sample with those of the Chinese sample, we find that the 
return variables are positively skewed for both markets, while the earnings variables are 
negatively (positively) skewed in the US (China) market. In addition, for the US firms, 
the median 3-year future earnings (0.118) is roughly three times the median of the current 
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earnings (0.042), while for the Chinese firms, the median of future earnings (0.092) is 
four times the median of current earnings (0.024), suggesting that the structural changes 
in China over the sample period with respect to earnings are evident. More importantly, 
the statistics indicate that Chinese firms have smoother earnings relative to US firms (i.e. 
the mean of Corr (ΔDAP, ΔPDI) is -0.775 for the Chinese sample compared with -0.632 
for the US sample). 
 
Table 3  Sample Statistics 
Panel A1: Descriptive statistics (13,194 US observations during 2003-2008) 
Variable Mean Std Dev Median Minimum Maximum 
Rt 0.174 0.679  0.058  -0.829  3.366  
Xt-1 -0.012 0.183  0.037  -1.271  0.248  
Xt 0.003 0.154  0.042  -0.893  0.363  
Xt3 0.060 0.485  0.118  -2.451  1.939  
Rt3 0.305 1.171  0.023  -0.945  7.553  
ACCt -0.075 0.171  -0.037 -1.210  0.455  
CFOt 0.078 0.151  0.073  -0.519  0.931  
Corr (ΔDAP, ΔPDI) -0.632 0.483  -0.850 -1.000  0.997  
Panel A2: Descriptive statistics (4,854 Chinese observations during 2003-2008) 
Variable Mean Std Dev Median Minimum Maximum 
Rt 0.363 1.069  0.066  -0.768  4.019  
Xt-1 0.019 0.069  0.024  -0.284  0.162  
Xt 0.027 0.077  0.024  -0.246  0.238  
Xt3 0.143 0.322  0.092  -0.639  1.448  
Rt3 1.292 1.766  0.779  -0.789  9.120  
ACCt -0.038 0.110  -0.021 -0.456  0.291  
CFOt 0.063 0.105  0.043  -0.224  0.460  
Corr (ΔDAP, ΔPDI) -0.775 0.362  -0.929 -1.000  0.984  
Panel B1: Pairwise Pearson (Spearman) correlations above (below) the diagonal 
 (13,194 US firm-year observations during 2003-2008) 
Variable Rt Xt-1 Xt Xt3 Rt3 Corr 
Rt - -0.209 0.089 0.148 -0.114 0.008# 
Xt-1 0.016! - 0.537 0.306 -0.014# -0.219 
Xt 0.311 0.581 - 0.444 -0.082 -0.22 
Xt3 0.34 0.362 0.513 - 0.306 -0.125 
Rt3 -0.121 0.141 0.081 0.464 - 0.001# 
Corr (ΔDAP, ΔPDI) -0.052 -0.294 -0.279 -0.194 -0.067 - 
Panel B2: Pairwise Pearson (Spearman) correlations above (below) the diagonal 
 (4,854 Chinese firm-year observations during 2003-2008) 
Variable Rt Xt-1 Xt Xt3 Rt3 Corr 
Rt - 0.053 0.296 0.212 -0.232 -0.007# 
Xt-1 0.198 - 0.572 0.332 -0.058 -0.226 
Xt 0.418 0.717 - 0.499 -0.035* -0.155 
Xt3 0.245 0.503 0.617 - 0.257 -0.102 
Rt3 -0.201 -0.012# -0.029* 0.227 - -0.007# 
Corr (ΔDAP, ΔPDI) -0.059 -0.224 -0.177 -0.14 -0.025! - 
The unmarked correlations are statistically significant at the 1% level or lower; * indicates statistically 
significant at the 1%-5% level; ! indicates statistically significant at the 5%-10% level; and # indicates 
statistically insignificant. 
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Table 3 Panel B provides the pairwise correlations for all the variables used in the 
primary tests. As expected, the correlations between current returns and current/future 
earnings are generally significantly positive. Also, the future returns are significantly 
correlated with future earnings, consistent with CKSS’s argument that future returns 
should not influence the regression results except through their role as a proxy for the 
measurement error in future earnings. More importantly, the variable Corr (ΔDAP, ΔPDI) 
is negatively associated with past, current, and future earnings for all the samples, 
consistent with TZ’s signalling argument that firms with better performance smooth 
earnings to a larger degree. 
3.3 Main Tests Results 
Table 4 presents the main tests results. 5  To confirm that income smoothing 
strengthens earnings persistence, we first estimate the earnings persistence model: 
tttttt EPSISaISaEPSaaEPS  32103                            (5) 
Consistent with the prediction, Panel A of Table 4 shows that the coefficients on 
ISt*EPSt are significantly positive (i.e. a3 = 0.863, t = 9.46 for the US sample, and a3 = 
1.751, t = 8.96 for the Chinese sample). 
Secondly, to provide the baseline results, we estimate the benchmark CKSS model 
(equation 3). We report the baseline results in Panel B of Table 4. As predicted, both 
ERC and FERC are significantly positive. In particular, for the US sample, the coefficient 
on Xt is 0.742 (t = 16.20) and the coefficient on Xt3 is 0.341, (t = 25.03), very similar to 
TZ. Furthermore, as predicted, the coefficients on past earnings (-1.399, t = -39.48) and 
on future returns (-0.104, t = 20.61) are both negative. The results hold for the Chinese 
sample. One difference is that the loadings on current earnings and future earnings for the 
Chinese sample are much higher (2.261, t = 11.03 for current earnings and 0.766, t = 
17.50 for future earnings) than the loadings for the US samples.   
Thirdly, we present the results of our primary tests in Panel C of Table 3. For the US 
sample, we find results consistent with TZ’s argument that income smoothing improves 
FERC, as evidenced by the significantly positive coefficient on ISt*Xt3 (0.417, t = 8.75). 
The results also indicate that the ERC of a higher-smoothing firm is greater than that of a 
lower-smoothing firm (the coefficient on ISt*Xt is 0.937, t = 5.06). Furthermore, the 
coefficients on ISt (-0.052, t = -2.59) and on ISt*Xt-1 (-1.476, t = -9.77) are both 
significant, confirming their role as control variables. Moreover, unlike TZ, our results 
show that the coefficient on Xt3 (0.161, t = 6.70) kept its significance after the inclusion 
of income smoothing. This suggests that stock price incorporates information about 
future earnings regardless of the presence of income smoothing. However, when testing 
the primary model using the Chinese sample, we find some interesting results that show 
that while income smoothing has no impact on FERC (i.e. the coefficient on ISt*Xt3 is 
0.105, t = 0.68), it does improves ERC (i.e. the coefficient on ISt*Xt is 3.840, t = 4.61).  
We argue that the market-level difference in information environment may partly 
account for the different results from the two markets with respect to the impact of 
income smoothing on FERC. In particular, as a better information environment makes 
value-relevant information more accessible to average investors, it reduces the costs of 
private information searching and facilitates more efficient investment decision making. 
                                                        
5 For comparison purposes, in each of the panels, we present, in two columns, (1) the results using the 
US sample and (2) the results using the Chinese sample.     
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Therefore, for firms in a market with a rich information environment (e.g. the US market), 
investors are able to utilise all sources of information to better interpret managers’ 
income-smoothing incentives in conveying private information about future earnings (i.e. 
income smoothing improves FERC). On the other hand, in a market with a poor 
information environment (e.g. the China market) where the information set is incomplete 
and the information uncertainty is high, investors may not be able to apply smoothed 
earnings to predict future earnings (i.e. income smoothing has no impact on FERC). 
Regarding the results for ERC, since one of the main purposes of income smoothing is to 
make current earnings more permanent and thus better representative of firm value, 
investors will always value current earnings more for higher-smoothing firms regardless 
of the richness of the information environment. Therefore, we find that income 
smoothing improves ERC for both the US and Chinese samples. 
TZ further extend the primary model by decomposing earnings into operating cash 
flows and accruals components and interacting each with ISt as follows: 
ttttt
tttttt
ttttttt
tttttt
eRISbACCISb
ACCISbACCISbCFOISb
CFOISbCFOISbISbRbACCb
ACCbACCbCFObCFObCFObbR







315314
13112311
101983736
514332110
        
        
        
              (6)
 
The purpose of the extended model is to examine whether income smoothing allows 
more information about future cash flows to be incorporated into the current stock prices. 
In Panel D of Table 4, we report the results for the estimation of the extended model. The 
coefficient on the variable ISt*CFOt3 is significantly positive for the US sample (i.e. 
0.311, t = 5.94) but insignificant for the Chinese sample (i.e. 0.177, t = 1.14). These 
results are consistent with the findings from the primary model on earnings variables. In 
particular, for US firms, income smoothing is associated with an increase in stock price 
informativeness about future cash flows. For Chinese firms, due to the relatively poor 
information environment, investors cannot fully appreciate the signalling effect of 
income smoothing on future cash flows. Also, for each US and Chinese sample, the 
coefficient on the variable ISt*CFOt is positive and significant (i.e. t-values of 4.41 and 
4.37 for the US sample and the Chinese sample, respectively), suggesting that stock price 
always captures more information about current cash flows when firms report smoother 
earnings. Regarding the accrual component, we report consistent evidence that the 
coefficient on ISt*ACCt is positive and significant for all samples, while the coefficient 
on ISt*ACCt3 is positive and significant only for the US sample and marginally 
significant for the Chinese sample (i.e. 0.257, t = 1.71). Since there is no underlying 
theory on how income smoothing affects the predictability of accruals, we do not provide 
an explanation for this result. We leave this unanswered question for future research. 
3.4 Robustness Tests 
One concern of the primary model is that we cannot rule out the possibility that the 
existence of other omitted factors could make stock prices incorporate more information 
about current and future earnings. To alleviate this concern, we include firm size (SIZE), 
book-to-market ratio (BM), future earnings variability (EarnStd), and analyst following 
(NANAL).6 Firm size and analyst following are used to control for differences in 
                                                        
6 Due to limited availability of data, we do not include institutional holding as a control variable in our 
analysis. 
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Table 4  Main Tests 
Panel A: Earnings persistence model 
tttttt EPSISaISaEPSaaEPS  32103  
Dep = EPSt3 US China 
EPSt 1.061*** 1.391*** 
 (25.65) (14.75) 
ISt 0.039*** 0.042*** 
 (2.91) (2.81) 
ISt*EPSt 0.863*** 1.751*** 
 (9.46) (8.96) 
Constant 0.027*** 0.098*** 
 (3.53) (11.96) 
Observations 13,194 4,853 
Adj. R-squared 0.203 0.261 
Prob > F 0 0 
Panel B: Benchmark CKSS model 
tttttt eRbXbXbXbbR   34332110  
Dep = Rt US China 
Xt-1 -1.399*** -2.912*** 
 (-39.48) (-14.16) 
Xt 0.742*** 2.261*** 
 (16.20) (11.03) 
Xt3 0.341*** 0.766*** 
 (25.03) (17.50) 
Rt3 -0.104*** -0.163*** 
 (-20.61) (-20.69) 
Constant 0.167*** 0.390*** 
 (29.43) (25.62) 
Observations 13,194 4,853 
Adj. R-squared 0.150 0.173 
Prob > F 0 0 
Panel C: Primary model 
ttt
tttttttttttt
eRISb
XISbXISbXISbISbRbXbXbXbbR

 
39
38716534332110
        
 
Dep = Rt US China 
Xt-1 -0.967*** -2.619*** 
 (-17.27) (-7.96) 
Xt 0.523*** 0.945*** 
 (7.05) (2.68) 
Xt3 0.161*** 0.686*** 
 (6.70) (7.83) 
Rt3 -0.102*** -0.160*** 
 (-10.92) (-9.92) 
ISt -0.052*** -0.027 
 (-2.59) (-0.50) 
ISt *Xt-1 -1.476*** -1.531* 
 (-9.77) (-1.68) 
ISt *Xt 0.937*** 3.840*** 
 (5.06) (4.61) 
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ISt *Xt3 0.417*** 0.105 
 (8.75) (0.68) 
ISt *Rt3 -0.010 -0.005 
 (-0.57) (-0.20) 
Constant 0.188*** 0.392*** 
 (16.23) (13.04) 
Observations 13,194 4,853 
Adj. R-squared 0.162 0.178 
Prob > F 0 0 
Panel D: Extended model - Earnings decomposition 
ttttt
tttttttttt
ttttttttt
eRISbACCISb
ACCISbACCISbCFOISbCFOISbCFOISb
ISbRbACCbACCbACCbCFObCFObCFObbR





315314
131123111019
83736514332110
        
         
Dep = Rt US China 
CFOt-1 -0.883*** -0.609 
 (-9.30) (-1.49) 
CFOt 0.483*** 1.068*** 
 (4.62) (2.77) 
CFOt3 0.260*** 0.615*** 
 (9.46) (6.72) 
ACCt-1 -0.747*** -2.168*** 
 (-13.86) (-7.86) 
ACCt 0.310*** 0.088 
 (4.57) (0.30) 
ACCt3 -0.067*** 0.370*** 
 (-2.60) (4.38) 
Rt3 -0.118*** -0.160*** 
 (-12.90) (-10.21) 
ISt -0.048** 0.048 
 (-2.02) (0.82) 
ISt*CFOt-1 -1.259*** -2.953*** 
 (-6.44) (-3.19) 
ISt*CFOt 0.919*** 3.579*** 
 (4.41) (4.37) 
ISt*CFOt3 0.311*** 0.177 
 (5.94) (1.14) 
ISt*ACCt-1 -1.547*** -1.873** 
 (-10.44) (-2.33) 
ISt*ACCt 0.706*** 3.626*** 
 (4.06) (4.85) 
ISt*ACCt3 0.442*** 0.257* 
 (8.88) (1.71) 
ISt*Rt3 0.001 -0.002 
 (0.05) (-0.07) 
Constant 0.104*** 0.241*** 
 (7.78) (7.31) 
Observations 13,194 4,853 
Adj. R-squared 0.186 0.215 
Prob > F 0 0 
Two-tailed t-statistics are presented in the parentheses. *, **, and *** denote t-statistics are significant at 
the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. All the variables are defined in Table 1. 
140 Cheng and Li 
 
information environment across sample firms. Larger-sized firms with greater analyst 
following tend to have a richer information environment. The book-to-market ratio is 
used to control for firm growth since high-growth firms tend to reflect more of their value 
from future earnings. Finally, we control for future earnings variability because volatile 
earnings are more difficult to predict. All the control variables are defined in the variable 
definitions in Table 1. 
We first add the control variables mentioned above to the primary model one at a 
time, referred to as Zt in Equation (7):  
tttttttttt
tttttttt
eXZbZbRISbXISbXISb
XISbISbRbXbXbXbbR

 
3111039387
16534332110
                   (7)
 
Panel A of Table 5 reports the results. In all the individual models, the coefficient on 
ISt*Xt3 remains positive and significant for the US sample, consistent with TZ’s 
conclusion that income smoothing improves FERC. For the Chinese sample, we confirm 
our previous conclusion that income smoothing improves ERC but not FERC, as 
evidenced by the significantly positive coefficient on ISt*Xt but insignificant coefficient 
on ISt*Xt3 after including the control variables. Panel B of Table 5 presents the results 
with all the control variables. Still, the finding that the current returns of 
higher-smoothing firms incorporate more information in their future earnings only holds 
for US firms, not for Chinese firms. 
In addition, Panel A and Panel B of Table 5 show consistent evidence regarding the 
control variables. For both the US and Chinese samples, the coefficient on the interaction 
between Xt3 and firm size and analyst following is significantly positive, confirming that 
the information environment is richer for large firms and firms with greater analyst 
following. The coefficient on the interaction between Xt3 and future earnings variability is 
significantly negative, confirming that stock price contains less information about future 
earnings when the earnings are more difficult to predict. Interestingly, in contradiction to 
the significantly positive coefficient for the US firms, the coefficient on the interaction 
between Xt3 and growth is negative for the Chinese firms. This suggests that the stock 
prices of high-growth firms in China incorporate less future earnings information. 
Since losses are more difficult to predict than profits, which are more likely to be 
normal and persistent, TZ control for differences in persistence using the LOSS dummy. 
ttttt
ttttttt
tttttttt
eXLOSSbXLOSSb
LOSSbRISbXISbXISb
XISbISbRbXbXbXbbR


 
31111
1039387
16534332110
        
        
                 (8)
 
Appendix Table I shows that after controlling for LOSS, the coefficient on ISt*Xt3 is 
significantly positive (i.e. 0292, t = 5.32) for the US firms but insignificant (i.e. -0.050, t 
= -0.28) for the Chinese firms, consistent with the previous findings. But the coefficient 
on ISt*Xt is insignificant for both the US firms (i.e. 0.248, t = 1.37) and the Chinese firms 
(i.e. 0.644, t = 0.67), suggesting that the impact of income smoothing on ERC is largely 
explained by the differences in persistence of earnings. In addition, both ERC and FERC 
are attenuated for loss firms in both the US and Chinese samples, suggesting that the 
stock price of loss firms reflects less information about their current and future earnings 
than that of profit firms.     
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Table 5  Additional Tests - Controlling for Potentially Omitted Variables 
Panel A: Adding a single new control variable  
tttttttt
tttttttttt
eXZbZbRISbXISb
XISbXISbISbRbXbXbXbbR

 
311103938
716534332110
        
  
Z= SIZE BM EarnStd NANAL 
Dep = Rt US    China US   China US   China US    China  
Xt-1 -0.951*** -2.600*** -0.945*** -2.532*** -0.968*** -2.623*** -0.958*** -2.496*** 
 (-16.98) (-7.89) (-16.99) (-7.73) (-17.28) (-8.07) (-17.14) (-7.65) 
Xt 0.530*** 0.921*** 0.522*** 1.005*** 0.516*** 0.740** 0.529*** 1.003*** 
 (7.14) (2.61) (7.07) (2.85) (6.94) (2.12) (7.14) (2.86) 
Xt3 0.065** 0.293*** 0.070** 1.023*** 0.206*** 1.912*** 0.033 -0.453*** 
 (2.34) (2.80) (2.49) (10.04) (6.46) (13.24) (1.03) (-2.72) 
Rt3 -0.103*** -0.163*** -0.097*** -0.160*** -0.102*** -0.165*** -0.104*** -0.149*** 
 (-11.09) (-10.15) (-10.49) (-9.99) (-10.98) (-10.34) (-11.22) (-9.26) 
ISt -0.055*** 0.011 -0.037* -0.043 -0.052*** -0.030 -0.051** 0.011 
 (-2.74) (0.20) (-1.88) (-0.79) (-2.62) (-0.56) (-2.54) (0.20) 
ISt*Xt-1 -1.482*** -1.611* -1.435*** -1.055 -1.493*** -1.555* -1.439*** -1.335 
 (-9.83) (-1.78) (-9.58) (-1.16) (-9.88) (-1.73) (-9.55) (-1.48) 
ISt*Xt 0.937*** 3.695*** 0.920*** 3.847*** 0.912*** 3.799*** 0.942*** 3.675*** 
 (5.07) (4.46) (5.01) (4.64) (4.92) (4.62) (5.10) (4.46) 
ISt*Xt3 0.400*** -0.002 0.352*** 0.206 0.429*** 0.104 0.396*** -0.024 
 (8.39) (-0.02) (7.32) (1.34) (8.96) (0.69) (8.32) (-0.16) 
ISt*Rt3 -0.009 -0.003 -0.009 0.000 -0.010 -0.006 -0.008 -0.014 
 (-0.52) (-0.10) (-0.49) (0.01) (-0.58) (-0.23) (-0.43) (-0.53) 
Zt -0.039* -0.167*** -0.250*** -0.080* 0.041** 0.109** -0.139*** -0.622*** 
 (-1.91) (-3.46) (-13.28) (-1.76) (2.19) (2.53) (-6.29) (-8.37) 
Zt*Xt3 0.305*** 0.854*** 0.192*** -0.789*** -0.079** -1.590*** 0.325*** 1.713*** 
 (6.67) (6.90) (5.42) (-6.50) (-2.10) (-10.59) (6.20) (8.09) 
Constant 0.199*** 0.445*** 0.311*** 0.432*** 0.166*** 0.299*** 0.259*** 0.775*** 
 (13.37) (11.97) (21.16) (12.43) (11.12) (7.78) (15.66) (13.86) 
Observations 13,194 4,853 13,191 4,853 13,194 4,853 13,194 4,853 
R-squared 0.166 0.188 0.175 0.190 0.163 0.198 0.167 0.196 
Adj. R-squared 0.165 0.186 0.175 0.188 0.163 0.197 0.166 0.194 
F test 237.9 101.7 254.7 103.1 234.0 108.9 240.0 107.4 
Prob > F 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Panel B: Full model   
Dep = Rt US China 
Xt-1 -0.932*** -2.399*** 
 (-13.63) (-7.42) 
Xt 0.595*** 0.937*** 
 (6.51) (2.69) 
Xt3 0.004 1.131*** 
 (0.07) (5.30) 
Rt3 -0.083*** -0.150*** 
 (-7.30) (-9.38) 
ISt -0.032 0.009 
 (-1.34) (0.17) 
ISt*Xt-1 -1.368*** -0.930 
 (-7.65) (-1.05) 
ISt*Xt 0.717*** 3.616*** 
 (3.17) (4.44) 
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ISt*Xt3 0.346*** 0.036 
 (5.99) (0.24) 
ISt*Rt3 -0.043** -0.009 
 (-1.98) (-0.35) 
SIZEt 0.024 -0.037 
 (0.58) (-0.70) 
SIZEt*Xt3 0.264*** 0.452*** 
 (2.85) (3.00) 
BMt -0.299*** -0.101** 
 (-11.86) (-2.22) 
BMt*Xt3 0.184*** -0.591*** 
 (4.02) (-4.82) 
EARNSTDt 0.163*** 0.109** 
 (6.77) (2.51) 
EARNSTDt*Xt3 -0.340*** -1.412*** 
 (-6.91) (-9.12) 
NANALt -0.190*** -0.691*** 
 (-4.26) (-8.45) 
NANALt*Xt3 -0.099 1.039*** 
 (-0.95) (4.00) 
Constant 0.465*** 0.788*** 
 (14.93) (12.81) 
Observations 8,638 4,853 
Adj. R-squared 0.196 0.221 
Prob > F 0 0 
Two-tailed t-statistics are presented in the parentheses. *, **, and *** denote t-statistics are significant at 
the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. All the variables are defined in Table 1. 
 
Appendix Table II reports the results from Fama-MacBeth regressions, which 
control for the potential positive cross-sectional correlations of the residuals. The results 
are consistent with the previous findings that income smoothing improves FERC for the 
US firms but has no effect on FERC for the Chinese firms.  
3.5 Additional Analysis of the China Results 
In the China market, a significant portion of listed firms are owned by the state and 
legal entities (mostly SOEs). The Chinese Government frequently appoints managers, 
which suggests that managers may have more incentives to act in the best interests of the 
state and legal persons than in the best interests of public shareholders. Therefore, this 
unique ownership structure significantly reduces information transparency (Piotroski and 
Wong, 2012). For example, profit maximisation is not the SOEs’ sole objective, and 
related-party transactions are prevalent in SOEs, which suppresses incentives to supply 
information to the public. In our sample, about 71.5% of the firms are SOEs. It is likely 
that our main finding that income smoothing has no impact on FERC in the China market 
is driven by the unique ownership structure of SOEs.  
Table 6 compares the results between SOEs and non-SOEs for estimation of the 
primary model (Panel A) and the extended model (Panel B). The classification of a 
Chinese firm’s ownership type is based on the owner who has the largest ownership 
control in the firm. CSMAR has collected ownership data from firms’ annual reports 
since 2001, when disclosure of the identity of the ultimate owner became mandatory. 
SOEs are defined as firms owned by state asset management bureaus or other SOEs 
controlled by the government. 
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Table 6  Additional Analysis for China Market (SOEs versus Non-SOEs) 
Panel A: Primary Model 
ttt
tttttttttttt
eRISb
XISbXISbXISbISbRbXbXbXbbR

 
39
38716534332110
        
 
Dep= Rt SOE Non-SOE 
Xt-1 -2.505*** -2.774*** 
 (-6.13) (-4.87) 
Xt 0.624 1.470** 
 (1.45) (2.33) 
Xt3 0.741*** 0.590*** 
 (6.94) (3.78) 
Rt3 -0.156*** -0.169*** 
 (-8.48) (-5.10) 
ISt -0.047 0.011 
 (-0.73) (0.10) 
ISt*Xt-1 -2.403** -0.143 
 (-2.12) (-0.09) 
ISt*Xt 5.363*** 1.374 
 (5.23) (0.95) 
ISt*Xt3 -0.088 0.421 
 (-0.47) (1.55) 
ISt*Rt3 -0.011 0.010 
 (-0.35) (0.19) 
Constant 0.393*** 0.392*** 
 (11.17) (6.76) 
Observations 3,468 1,385 
Adj. R-squared 0.182 0.169 
Prob > F 0 0 
Panel B: Extended Model - Earnings Decomposition   
ttttt
tttttttttt
ttttttttt
eRISbACCISb
ACCISbACCISbCFOISbCFOISbCFOISb
ISbRbACCbACCbACCbCFObCFObCFObbR





315314
131123111019
83736514332110
        
         
Dep = Rt SOE Non-SOE 
CFOt-1 -0.576 -0.142 
 (-1.17) (-0.19) 
CFOt 0.732 1.868*** 
 (1.55) (2.70) 
CFOt3 0.689*** 0.447** 
 (6.26) (2.57) 
ACCt-1 -2.004*** -2.353*** 
 (-5.77) (-4.97) 
ACCt -0.339 0.923* 
 (-0.95) (1.70) 
ACCt3 0.392*** 0.285** 
 (3.58) (2.02) 
Rt3 -0.149*** -0.190*** 
 (-8.32) (-5.87) 
ISt 0.076 0.009 
 (1.10) (0.08) 
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ISt*CFOt-1 -3.035*** -3.846** 
 (-2.74) (-2.25) 
ISt*CFOt 4.486*** 1.788 
 (4.57) (1.19) 
ISt*CFOt3 -0.007 0.627** 
 (-0.04) (2.09) 
ISt*ACCt-1 -2.335** -1.413 
 (-2.38) (-0.98) 
ISt*ACCt 4.581*** 1.864 
 (5.16) (1.34) 
ISt*ACCt3 0.252 0.320 
 (1.34) (1.21) 
ISt*Rt3 -0.017 0.038 
 (-0.56) (0.74) 
Constant 0.200*** 0.317*** 
 (5.05) (5.24) 
Observations 3,468 1,385 
Adj. R-squared 0.222 0.204 
Prob > F 0 0 
Two-tailed t-statistics are presented in the parentheses. *, **, and *** denote t-statistics are significant at 
10%, 5%, and 1% level. All the variables are defined in the variable definition in Table 1. 
 
The results for SOEs are consistent with our previous findings that in the China 
market, a higher-smoothing firm’s future earnings and cash flows are incorporated in its 
current stock price to the same extent as a lower-smoothing firm’s future earnings and 
cash flows. For non-SOEs, although income smoothing still only has a little impact on 
FERC (i.e. the coefficient on ISt*Xt3 is 0.421, t = 1.55), its impact on the ability of current 
returns to capture the information in future cash flows is significant and positive (i.e. the 
coefficient on ISt*CFOt3 is 0.627, t = 2.09). These results suggest that compared with 
SOEs, non-SOEs have a relatively better information environment, in which investors 
may utilise other information more to understand the impact of income smoothing on the 
informativeness of earnings and cash flows. However, it is puzzling that different from 
SOEs, the income smoothing of non-SOEs does not improve ERC anymore (i.e. the 
coefficient on ISt*Xt is 1.374, t = 0.95). We leave it for future research to explore the 
potential explanations. 
 
IV. Conclusion 
In this paper, we re-examine the impact of income smoothing on earnings 
informativeness and compare the results between the US and China markets. We find that 
while income smoothing improves FERC in the US market, it has little impact on FERC 
in the China market. We further conduct additional analyses with respect to the impact of 
income smoothing on FERC by comparing SOEs and non-SOEs. The results offer some 
preliminary support for our argument that the country-level difference in information 
environment may partly account for the different results from the two markets. 
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Appendix 
Table I  Robustness Tests - Profit versus Loss Firms 
tttttttt
tttttttttttt
eXLOSSbXLOSSbLOSSbRISb
XISbXISbXISbISbRbXbXbXbbR

 
311111039
38716534332110
       
 
Dep = Rt US China 
Xt-1 -0.835*** -2.699*** 
 (-15.48) (-7.28) 
Xt 3.267*** 10.277*** 
 (23.87) (18.82) 
Xt3 0.374*** 0.396*** 
 (13.45) (3.63) 
Rt3 -0.107*** -0.156*** 
 (-11.96) (-9.72) 
ISt -0.034* 0.184*** 
 (-1.76) (2.96) 
ISt*Xt-1 -1.023*** -3.437*** 
 (-7.04) (-3.36) 
ISt*Xt 0.248 0.644 
 (1.37) (0.67) 
ISt*Xt3 0.292*** -0.050 
 (6.32) (-0.28) 
ISt*Rt3 -0.009 -0.007 
 (-0.51) (-0.28) 
LOSSt 0.026 -0.064 
 (1.59) (-1.42) 
LOSSt*Xt -3.236*** -11.847*** 
 (-24.26) (-21.85) 
LOSSt*Xt3 -0.411*** -0.252** 
 (-16.68) (-2.17) 
Constant -0.011 0.071* 
 (-0.76) (1.79) 
Observations 13,194 4,854 
Adj. R-squared 0.232 0.277 
Prob > F 0 0 
Two-tailed t-statistics are presented in the parentheses. *, **, and *** denote t-statistics are significant at 
10%, 5%, and 1% level. All the variables are defined in Table 1 in the main text. 
Table II  Robustness Tests - Fama-MacBeth Regressions 
Panel A: Primary Model 
ttt
tttttttttttt
eRISb
XISbXISbXISbISbRbXbXbXbbR

 
39
38716534332110
        
 
Dep = Rt US China 
Xt-1 -0.486** -0.931 
 (-3.79) (-1.59) 
Xt 0.505** 1.077** 
 (3.52) (3.33) 
Xt3 0.108** 0.467*** 
 (3.21) (6.09) 
Rt3 -0.053* -0.111* 
 (-2.04) (-2.14) 
ISt -0.062 -0.017 
 (-0.90) (-0.22) 
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ISt*Xt-1 -1.281** -1.352*** 
 (-3.82) (-4.08) 
ISt*Xt 1.083*** 1.735** 
 (4.80) (2.62) 
ISt*Xt3 0.306** -0.178 
 (3.94) (-1.02) 
ISt*Rt3 -0.032 0.015 
 (-1.06) (0.41) 
Constant 0.168 0.327 
 (0.94) (0.84) 
Observations 13,194 4,854 
R-squared 0.165 0.246 
Prob > F 0.000483 0.000110 
Panel B: Extended Model 
ttttt
tttttttttt
ttttttttt
eRISbACCISb
ACCISbACCISbCFOISbCFOISbCFOISb
ISbRbACCbACCbACCbCFObCFObCFObbR





315314
131123111019
83736514332110
        
         
Dep = Rt US China 
CFOt-1 -1.019*** -0.893*** 
 (-6.82) (-4.52) 
CFOt 0.762** 1.245** 
 (2.67) (3.76) 
CFOt3 0.213*** 0.396*** 
 (4.60) (4.87) 
ACCt-1 -0.271** -0.584 
 (-2.65) (-1.58) 
ACCt 0.391* 0.786** 
 (2.26) (4.01) 
ACCt3 -0.066 0.352*** 
 (-1.18) (7.02) 
Rt3 -0.066* -0.104* 
 (-2.26) (-2.06) 
ISt -0.060 -0.037 
 (-0.79) (-0.38) 
ISt*CFOt-1 -0.710 -1.044 
 (-1.71) (-1.68) 
ISt*CFOt 0.675* 1.578 
 (2.14) (1.62) 
ISt*CFOt3 0.282*** -0.122 
 (4.57) (-0.67) 
ISt*ACCt-1 -1.307** -1.543*** 
 (-3.48) (-5.65) 
ISt *ACCt 0.785** 1.724* 
 (2.72) (2.43) 
ISt*ACCt3 0.391** -0.098 
 (3.40) (-0.72) 
ISt*Rt3 -0.026 0.010 
 (-0.75) (0.29) 
Constant 0.118 0.318 
 (0.67) (0.82) 
Observations 13,194 4,853 
R-squared 0.203 0.254 
Prob > F 0.00498 0.0410 
Two-tailed t-statistics are presented in the parentheses. *, **, and *** denote t-statistics are significant at 
10%, 5%, and 1% level. All the variables are defined in Table 1 in the main text. 
